GlobalNav,
The stall detection software ran the stick shaker, falsely reporting a stall condition, which caused the Ethiopian pilots to initially not reduce power, sending them down a very difficult to escape hole that rapidly closed around them. Had the AoA system simply said "I'm out of range" and the associated FCC taken itself off line, both planes would have flown fine, MCAS would never have triggered, and there would be no distraction from the stick shaker and other false stall warnings.
As it is Boeing seems to be doing a lot more with the software than modifying the MCAS response, including apparently cross-checking the FCCs for reasonable agreement. I expect the result will be that MCAS will not ever see the limits placed on it because the data supplied to it will be filtered to prevent its operation outside of the originally intended envelope.
There is something to the notion that it's all one piece, but in planes without MCAS is it reasonable to tell a pilot the plane is stalling, sounding stall horns and shaking the daylights out of the control wheel when the plane is not near stall? Should the pilot react by shoving the nose down in response or is it reasonable for the pilot to ignore the stall warnings? That's the initiator - bad AoA; fix that first and STS/MCAS/whatever else that depends on it will work correctly or fail gracefully.