Originally Posted by
keesje
MCAS can be relatively easily fixed. Add sensor redundancy, fault logic, improve emergency warning system, training.
I think the safety culture and certification process are the bigger problen now.
It seems Boeing had the rule makers (congress) and regulator (FAA) in the pocket over the last 8 years.
Boeing, congress and FAA fought shoulder to shoulder against the foreign competition.
Far reaching grandfathering of requirements and design was re-allowed, responsibilities delegated and FAA forcefully "Streamlined"
JATR recommendations and GAO reports are 100% contradicting on FAA aircraft certification & it is totally clear to me who the more objective:
Congress (GAO) 2017:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683649.pdf
JATR 2019:
https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attac...A_Oct_2019.pdf
None of the regulators investigating MCAS and its consequences seem to agree that it can be easily fixed, mostly because they don't believe that the stes you outline would result in a safe and effective system.
As for the the GAO report, it was intended to review FAA's
efficiency, particularly in implementing the provisions of the 2012 act and serving as a taxpayer-paid advocate for (mostly) Boeing in international markets. There was nothing "objective" about the Act and the GAO review was clearly meant to report on the FAA's performance as industry facilitator and cheerleader, which we know it is better at than . . . some other things. It's no surprise that the JATR document is more objective and more useful.