Originally Posted by
MechEngr
There isn't a fundamental problem with MCAS; there is a fundamental problem with the AoA system that tells pilots and other systems incorrect information about the status of the airplane. Had the FCCs simply dropped out when the AoA became unreliable, it would have taken MCAS with them. There was no need to report a stall condition when there wasn't one and no need to correct for a high AoA when that was also untrue.
Yes, there is. First of all, the MCAS functional system includes the sensors designed to interface with it. Just because there was no software coding error that caused the fatal accidents, doesn’t mean MCAS is not at fault. If there was absolutely nothing wrong with MCAS, then why is Boeing changing MCAS? Angle of attack sensor technology and reliability are well known by Boeing and other OEMs. There is no mystery that an AoA sensor can malfunction, and the system safety requirements for certification require taking such information into account. It’s hard to understand how Boeing could not have known about and failed to adequately analyzed the failure conditions of the MCAS function. Perhaps, as many posts have suggested, Boeing managers chose not to devote the required time and resources to do so. May the truth be revealed.