Agree with gums; technical issues belong elsewhere.
The 737 Max problem is not associated with FBW or stick configuration.
The 737 Max aerodynamic issue involves a stability deficiency (not instability or complete flight envelope), which is corrected by use of background trim to adjust stick force (pilot’s perception of stability). The problem is with the implementation of the system and particularly its overall integrity wrt single sensor failure (or equivalent) which was exposed by the two accidents.
This thread opened at a time where it was envisaged that a simple software ‘fix’ (Boeing proposal 1) and new / revised checklists would provide an acceptable solution. Neither has done so, hence the wide-ranging discussion as more information becomes available, and the apparent difficulty in providing an acceptable solution for all authorities.
The situation is further complicated by the exposure of a deficient certification process, and the world wide views on piloting capabilities in rare abnormal failures.
As of now, Boeing has yet to provide an acceptable technical solution for recertification of MCAS. Then it is not clear how much work will be involved addressing concerns about recovery from extreme trim offsets which were identified as a consequence of the accidents. Checklist / training might be sufficient, but perhaps not acceptable to all ‘agencies’ involved.
The general deficiency of poor / multiple alerting and crew response, and any credit for human involvement for failure cases in support of certification might be outside of the agreed certification baseline for the Max (grandfather rights), thus this should not be a current problem.
However, nothing should be taken assured with this complex issue.
Last edited by PEI_3721; 21st Oct 2019 at 20:56.