Originally Posted by
infrequentflyer789
Not just that, my understanding is that the e-cab is supposed to be exactly the same computers running the same software as the actual plane, so saying it was faulty "simulator software" doesn't make sense, to me at least. We don't know which software version it was, if it was the same as final production or indeed if it is a version that was ever flight tested - maybe Forkner made a defect report on it and it was modified before it flew. But that isn't what Boeing is saying, what they are saying makes no sense. Also worth noting that the e-cab isn't full motion (from the pics I have seen) so wouldn't have been able to replicate -ve g effects or anything like, and nor does it appear he had stick shaker or EFS to contend with, yet he still appears to have had a big problem with it.
There's another problem with Boeing statement though - they insist the FAA and other CAAs were informed of the changes to MCAS (directly contradicting the JATR report - not like B are going to need anything from those organisations any time soon...), and also that those changes were demonstrated in flight testing in Aug 2016. Forkners messages are from November 2016. So they were flight testing in August but the magic simulator which was supposed to mean they didn't need actual flight tests was "still undergoing testing and qualification and had not been finalized" in November. Huh?
Final irony, for those that haven't spotted it already, is of course that had Boeing really really captured the regulator and been allowed to certify "without test flights" they would never have discovered their modelling c**k-up, they would never have changed MCAS, and the MAX would probably have been safer... (and no that doesn't mean I think it should have been done that way).
They are just splitting hairs I guess.
This "e-cab" sounds linke something which is generally refered to as a Hardware in the loop simulator.
All your cockpit and half the electronics bay is "real" (e.g. FCC and AP are, radios most likely not, IRS coud be not or half/half i.e. sensors are not, whereas computational unit is) , the sensors are not (sensor model), plane is not (plant model), environment is not (environment model).
Your AOA signal will then be generated based on aerodynamical calculations from the plant model (which interacts with the environment model), fed into the sensor model, which then generates either an analog signal - corresponding to what the vane would give you - or a digital signal - corresponding to what which ever box connects to the vane would give you. From there it runs into the real boxes.
From the tales told it seems a "real" MCAS event has happened due to some fault in either plant or sensor model. Therefore no one expected to see that in the wild. Well until a faulty single AOA vane produced the very same mess than some faulty model in the sim. So it doesn't matter if the the fault was intentionally inserted as part of a simulating a faulty AOA sensor or unintentionally due to some wrong coding in a sensor model - Mr F. got to know MCAS pretty much the same way than others would two years later.
So he did know now, that the envelope he described to the FAA for MCAS was, well, let's call it "incomplete" and that an MCAS event could be a pretty scary thing.
More intresting that this boozy conversation (well, other than regarding shop/sim floor morale during 737max development) is what happened the following days. Did he dig deeper? Did he report? To whom? Who pushed back? Would he have been allowed to follow up with FAA without asking for permission? Did he recieve a gag order?
So contrary to common perception I do not YET see him guilty. It all depends on the aftermath. Looking at the timeline will also be crucial (e.g. was the request to remove MCAS from the handbooks before or after that event?).
Anyway, on Wednesday Q3 figures are due by BA.