Originally Posted by
desert goat
I reckon a few of us could hazard a pretty good guess what caused that engine to quit. But as you say, we shouldn't have to. It's supposed to be their job, not ours. But with 129 pages in the report, you'd think they could have spared a paragraph to discuss how the carby float bowl ended up dry. I'll just leave that there.
They did - kinda sorta... Obviously negating the fact that a negative-G bunt would introduce
fuel air into the lines at both tank inlets simultaneously. We each have our own theories, but Occams razor still applies.
Originally Posted by The ATSB
It is possible that the en route manoeuvres being conducted during the flight briefly unported one of the fuel tanks, resulting in air feeding into the fuel line from that tank. However, all of the available evidence indicates that the fuel selector was selected to both tanks during the flight, and air being fed into the engine from one side should not have led to a total power loss. In addition, the en route manoeuvres stopped about 80 seconds prior to the total engine power loss. Overall, it seems very unlikely that the en route manoeuvres could have introduced sufficient air into the engine from both fuel tanks at the same time, resulting in an engine power loss, particularly one occurring so long after the manoeuvres ceased.
However, in <0G, you are not introducing air into one side only. You are introducing it into
both sides simultaneously. And with the fuel onboard at the time of the accident estimated to be between 46L and 73L or as low as 23L a side from a capacity of 79.5 or less than 30% capacity worst case (TO fuel 53L total) or 45% best case (TO fuel 80L) there is an awful lot of ullage in which to unport the fuel inlet...Granted the ATSB feels it is an unlikely cause, but they also think it unlikely it introduce air in the first place yet provide no other plausible explanation as to how the carb ended up bone dry, particularly when they are at pains to say they were careful during its' removal to ensure any remaining liquid was not lost.
Have a look at the graph on page 106, Aerobatics in the period 1034:20-1035:30 before a pushover with another bunt at 1036:15 that peaked at 750'. The engine failed 80 seconds later at 60' . What the expected fuel flow in that descent was is not addressed vs a comparison to the amount the lines from the tank inlets can hold to see if flow-required > fuel in lines or vice versa. They do say the engine will stop in 9 seconds if you turn off the fuel valve with the engine at full power, but you have twice, maybe three times the fuel valve->engine distance compared to the tank -> fuel valve distance and he wasn't descending at full power...
Originally Posted by The ATSB
Contrary to both regulatory requirements and the operator’s written procedures, the baggage and camp supplies in the aircraft were not restrained by any means.
Not to mention common sense. One of many wilful violations it would appear.
Originally Posted by The ATSB
In this case, both the chief pilot and the pilot of the accident flight believed the passengers and baggage was such that VH-WTQ was loaded well below its maximum take-off weight (MTOW). However, a detailed review of the available information found that the aircraft was at least 17 kg over its MTOW, and the pilots had underestimated the weight of the passengers and the baggage. The available evidence also indicates that the operator’s other aircraft (VH-JER), flown by the chief pilot, was loaded above its MTOW on the first flight of the day.
Guidance material from CASA released in 1990 advised against the practice of using standard weights for aircraft with less than seven seats, and it advocated for the use of accurate weights. CASA had also specifically advised the operator during a site inspection in 2015 against the practice of using standard weights, and the chief pilot had replied in writing that in future the operator’s pilots would weigh all passengers and baggage. Unfortunately, that did not occur.
Why not? Again, the culture there seemed to be one of wilful disregard to those rules and procedures they deemed irrelevant.
Originally Posted by The ABC
More than a decade ago, in 2007, when Mr Rhoades worked for another company, CASA grounded him which resulted in him pleading guilty in the Magistrates Court to four charges. He was directed to undertake theory and flight examinations to demonstrate that he had the necessary knowledge and skill to continue to hold those licences.
He pleaded guilty to administrative issues with his pilot's log book and maintenance sheets. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of unauthorised commercial operations. Mr Rhoades said he did charter flights but the company he worked for did not have a charter licence, something Mr Rhoades said he did not know and rectified once alerted.
He also let a tourist get a photo touching the controls mid-flight, which is not allowed. He said he never did it again and has had a clean slate up until the 2017 plane crash.
Source article
So, CAsA grounded him a decade ago for record "issues" and to get his licence back he has to undergo theory and practical re-certification yet the CP of an operation "keeps the MR of an aircraft in his car", and permits a pilot from his operation to fly an aircraft without the MR in the aircraft?
Every pilot knows one of the things that must be carried on an aircraft is the MR...
Originally Posted by
BigPapi
If only CASA and ATSB had your insight. They'd save themselves a lot of time and trouble.
CAsA might cop a lot of sh1t - including some from me - but they can't help people that won't help themselves. They pointed out issues in that operation, the CP said "Oh, sorry, I'll fix it, we won't do it again!" and as soon as the FOI is out of sight, they go straight back to their old ways. And like it or not, this
is the predictable result of tom-foolery in an aircraft not designed for it, coupled with an indifferent attitude to the rules. Have a look at some of the commentary about this mob's videos discussed here and on other forums previously -
as early as 2011!
Originally Posted by
currawong
Wonder why, this occurred on this flight...
Why not on one of the many, many flights that preceded it, that were operated more or less identically?
The same could be said about any aviation accident. Why did the ADIRS fail when it did on QF72? Why did 1549 hit birds when every other airliner flew through them, both before and since? Why did BA038 suffer dual engine rollback on short final when it had only ever affected one engine until then? One small hole in the cheese lined up with this one - but the report isn't robust enough to find that slice of cheese to prevent other asshats from repeating this mistake.
There are very few new ways to kill yourself in aviation. People just don't want to learn from other's and keep repeating the same ones...