Originally Posted by
LowObservable
That is true as far as it goes. However, 2 and 4 apply widely and the overall safety trend has been positive for many years. Then one airplane type enters service...
Granted, aviation has been getting safer, in large part to improved procedures, technological aids (GPWS, TCAS, GPS, and the like), more reliable aircraft designs as well as the
appropriate use of automation. But at the same time, I think what has occurred with the MAX underscores one of the unintended consequences of these improvements - less diligence elsewhere. I think the proper term for this is "risk homeostasis" - decreased risk on one area leads to a change in behavior that increases risk elsewhere. An example would be the Telsa owner who pays less attention to the road conditions because they have an autopilot-type device "protecting" them.
There is an unrelenting pressure for all manufacturers and operators to cut costs or maintain schedule where they can. Though not for the same reasons, even regulatory agencies like the FAA deal with similar pressures, and yielding to those pressures can impact the overall safety of aviation. Any adverse changes may not show up readily at first because other layers of the safety net trap and contain the issue. However, when one of the foundational layers is removed - in this case a basic design problem with the aircraft - then the deficiencies in these other areas become very apparent.
There's a well-known quote by (I think) Warren Buffet applying to the finance world: "You don't know who is swimming naked until the tide goes out." I think the tide went out with the MAX, and we are seeing quite a few parties embarrassed by their sudden nakedness.