Salute!
Sorry, tiddles. Have to take issue with the single AoA aspect of the crashes, although MCAS use of a single sensor for a critical control surface was flat out unacceptable. Ditto for folks keep asserting that a third crewmember "saved" the previous Lion flight. Until we hear their testimony as to what happened, I remain a skeptic.
My view of the elephant
- Part of the elephant was the implementation.
- Another was not telling the operators.
- And finally, a certifiation process that scares the hell outta me.
The fundamental flaw was using a kludge trim system feature to meet 40 year-old certification requirements that apply to the cable/pulley/pushrod control system that provides control wheel feedback as AoA increases and you "should" have to pull harder to increase AoA. Airbus does not have to meet this requirement. How come?
The implementation of MCAS without explaining it to the pilots and maintenance folks and so forth was reprehensible. I may have handled the rogue MCAS after a rought few seconds or minutes before turning off the trim, but I most likely would haver turned off only one switch that disabled A/P inputs to the stab trim. You see? The switches didn't work like they used to for the last 30 years. The control column cutout switch was also disabled. Did they tell me about that too? I don't think so, because that was part of the kludge.
Did big B come clean with the FAA about how MCAS worked and changes to the basic implentation that was not as harsh or strong? How about fault tree analysis briefings?
Oh well. back to the cave.
Gums sends....