Originally Posted by
Mortmeister
This incident appears to bear some striking resemblance to that which occurred to Hawk T1A XX334 on 19(R) Sqn at 2TWU in September 1992.
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=55475
In this instance, the person that died was I believe, an experienced Hawk QFI, participating in a QWI course. He was in the rear cockpit, with the Captain in the front cockpit.
This incident still haunts me to this day and I wonder were the lessons learned adequately promulgated around the Hawk community of today?
I speak only as an armourer on the squadron that was 'back-seat qualified' and on shift at the time of the crash. I/we flew many times in the rear cockpit, sometimes to deploy to Coningsby or Leuchars for a small '2-ship' Det. and on occasion, just for fun in the weather ship or a target tug. The practice was actively encouraged by our aircrew and the guys and girls the squadron loved it. But let's be clear, we were passengers, not supernumerary crew.
To the best of
my knowledge, EFATO was never practiced when ground crew were being carried in the rear cockpit. We were however always meticulously briefed, each trip, on the possibility and procedure for ejection. Always challenged to confirm that the Command Selector Valve in the rear cockpit was 'down and off' during taxi, even though the pilot would have checked it when we got to the aircraft.
Fair to say that I had a very good understanding of the ejection seat, but I'm not sure that I would have ever initiated ejecting without being instructed to do so; maybe if I knew that the pilot had been incapacitated by something like a birdstrike, but highly unlikely. If an engine failure had ever occurred on take-off (and I don't recall any during my six years on the Hawk), the only thing I would have done is sit tight, keep quiet and wait for instructions!
For us ground crew minions, we place our trust in our pilots and accept the risk.
I'm sure that Cpl Bayliss was like I, was just pinching himself at how lucky he was to be able to have such an experience. RIP mate....
You have written a post describing my thoughts far better than I could have done, using a valid accident to illustrate them.
I too have been in your situation and almost certainly would not have recognised that a PFL exercise had gone awry, until far too late.
Indeed, hearing the engine start to spool-up may have reassured me that we were overshooting?
Like you, I felt I did have enough knowledge to deal with an obvious situation, if presented.
There are times when we are totally reliant on the skills of others - thus sensible rules are written for our protection.
As an example, over the years, the rules on carrying ATC Cadets on helicopters were made more stringent, much limiting the exercises cleared with them on board.
They may have enjoyed being there, but they did not need to be and almost certainly had no balanced view of the associated risks.
Having "contracts" is not a phrase I am familiar with, I learn.
However, it does seem to have many parameters to satisfy - looks good on paper, but is it clear enough in a dynamic situation?
A simple gate might be easier?
lsh