Sully is , dare I say it , only partly right.
The sequence of events did start out as an Airspeed Disagree event ,caused by an angle of attack indicator failure, but the crew failed to complete the Non - Normal checklist correctly.
The first items on the checklist are DISCONNECT autopilot and autothrottle. Fly the aircraft.
The unintended consequence of the angle of attack failure led to the activation of the MCAS ,which led to to stab. trim motion ,which led to the loss of control. Completing the Runaway Stabilizer Non-Normal checklist would have resolved the issue.
The failure of the angle of attack indicator ultimately led to TWO Non-normal checklists having to be completed correctly and promptly.
Neither were.
As a long time B737 Pilot I sympathise with the crew. The situation they found themselves in was extremely difficult. I’ve been there.Boeing checklists are difficult to run simultaneously with multiple failures. But the fact remains that completing both checklists correctly would have salvaged the situation.
The B737MAX is not a fatally flawed design.
That’s where Langewiesche’s article is closer to the whole truth.
Training issues for new start airlines in third world countries will be an ongoing nightmare for Boeing AND Airbus for the foreseeable future, regardless of the outcome of the current investigation.