Interesting aspects emerging from the link (8 Oct) @#3004
Checklist discussions involve those listed below; the last three could (or should) involve new annunciations / alerting.
Unreliable airspeed
Unreliable altitude
Angle of Attack (AoA) disagree
Speed trim failure
Stabilizer out of trim
Runaway stabilizer trim
Unreliable airspeed and altitude are linked to the ADC, as is unreliable AoA which invokes all three together; thence current discussions on multiple alerting, distraction, surprise, workload.
Might these now be separated somehow. Also how might unreliable AoA be integrated with stick shake; with only two sensors a difference can be identified but not which is correct, implying that stickshake cannot be differentiated true or false (as today).
Speed trim failure - new ? How engineered.
Stab out of trim; very interesting, how determined.
Runaway stab trim; similarly challenging, with significant issues involving crew alerting, crew reaction (drill and switching - modified switches?), and an unambiguous memory items.
No MCAS ‘FAIL’ (inhibited) annunciation ?
There is also the need for both flight control computers to be available for dispatch (MMEL). This suggest use of dual computing paths involving the critical trim functions.