Originally Posted by
Tomaski
Hate to sound like a broken record here, but in terms of the chain of causation it doesn't have to be an either or choice. It is entirely possible to have deficiencies in design, production, regulatory oversight, corporate culture, maintenance, training, or what have you - all at the same time and all making a contribution to the accident. Maybe instead of this endless debate regarding the primacy of one particular causal factor over another, we should rather try to identify ALL the casual factors and agree that all of them need to be addressed.
Lets start at the start -
U/S AoA on lots of 737 NG's = No problem.
U/S AoA on the MAX = 2 fatal crashes.
Why such a big difference?
Have all AoA failures on NG's only happened to well trained crews?
Would a manual working trim wheel have saved the day?
Is computer based training better than simulator training?
Would simulator training have made a difference?
Would these two MAX's have crashed if they were NG's?
Boeing seem adamant that only a very small amount of training needs to be done to fly the MAX after the NG and that can be done on a computer.
We do not have NG's scattered underground and underwater with current trained crews, even with the manual trim limitations - most seem happy to still allow them (aircraft and crew) to fly.
Something should stand out as to why MAX's crash, and not NG's.
The industry has issues that need to be addressed in general, but the MAX has specific issues that must be addressed. Because the general standards have holes, that were exploited.