Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
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If the system had done that, they'd most likely have had a tool to (1) recognize and (2) deal with that particular malfunction, one that comes from a spurious AoA indication/signal that then creates a movement of a primary flight control.
In five month's time, "what's it doing and what do I do about it?" had not had an answer spread to the entire Max fleet operators and pilots effectively.
There are multiple links in that chain, and I'll not derail this discussion further.
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The most potentially dangerous period in Max ops was probably just after event 3 - remember Boeing saying initially the ship was safe - no procedures out - just the vague advice memo? But the aircraft was still being flown commercially.
In these discussions just after event 3, one contributor wrote that he would include in his TO brief, setting flaps if suspected MCAS rogue operation happened after take off, to kill the operation.
He was blasted from all sides for making up a procedure which was not official or in the books.
MCAS was not in the books either. Neither was a dedicated procedure available - just the stab runaway drill and we know how successful that can prove.
I have to say that if I were to have to fly a Max during that period before the grounding, I would have briefed something similar - with hindsight gained from the slowly emanating facts: If speed anomaly, stick shaker etc (first signs of the AOL problem) occurred on liftoff, to keep flaps extended while trouble shooting the speed indications, then land asap. I presume the AP, which would also kill MCAS ops, might well not engage with disagreements.
Very likely criticism would have come in stereo but we would have lived - and the tea and biscuits would have tasted very good.
That was then. Now is now. What is a few months more or less? We had better get it right.