You've thrown together three impressive straw men, Yanair. There is another view, though. Boeing, because of decisions driven by cost, and potential lost profit, cobbled together a Frankenstein of an aircraft. It was so poorly designed that the end result won't fly without a computer program to make extreme flight control inputs to keep it from *increasing AOA too quickly with too little backpressure.* Then they deliberately left that system out of training manuals and system descriptions, to complete the illusion that it was just another 737, hiding it's full effect from the FAA, as well as customers. Then they pressed on, due to the economic pressure from a re-engined Airbus, and promises made to traditional Boeing customers, producing the plane as quickly as possible. When the first one crashed, they covered their a**es by saying that there was a procedure that could have prevented it...even though it didn't really fit the description of "runaway trim". The situation was confusing enough that another crew had the same results. In all, 346 people are dead, and Boeing says, "not our fault." And now, they are coming up with a long promised solution that still appears to allow multiple MCAS applications of AND trim, for as long as the system is somehow reset. We don't know the current conditions of that reset (as the original pilots did not know those conditions in their version of MCAS). Seven months after the second crash, no new MCAS program has been submitted, nor training revealed ... but somehow the pilots, and lack of pilot training, are to blame for the whole thing. More training is a good idea. I am at a loss as to how you train a pilot on a system while revealing as little as possible about it.
*some might call that instability, leading to a stall.
Last edited by Takwis; 6th Oct 2019 at 00:14.