Originally Posted by
Notanatp
There seems to be an assumption in the article and in the comments that a retrofitted EICAS would have been likely to have prevented these two accidents. How realistic is that assumption?
In JT610, the crew knew they had a malfunctioning stab trim system and they figured out they could keep the plane in the air using MET. They were focused on the stab trim problem but they just couldn't figure out that they needed to shut off electric trim. How would EICAS have fixed this? Presumably, it would have focused the crew on the principal problem (malfunctioning AoA) and suppressed some of the cascading warnings (e.g., stick shaker, IAS disagree) but the crew was already focused on solving the problem. Would EICAS have displayed a "Turn off the freakin electric trim" message?
In ET302, the crew knew they had a stab trim malfunction and they shut off electric trim, but didn't relieve control column forces first. They then knew they were out of trim, but were apparently confused about what to do about it. What would EICAS have added? Would it have displayed a "Don't turn the electric trim back on" message? Or maybe a message "If you turn electric trim back on, trim up fast and then turn it off"?
I understand the general assumption that less noise/flashing lights may lead to better decision making, particularly at the very beginning of an incident. But both crews were past that and were controlling the plane (even climbing in the case of ET302), albeit with significant effort. Isn't it hugely speculative to say that EICAS would have made any difference in the outcome?
I could have a lengthy argument about your statement, but that would take us off topic. Regulators clearly think that pilot workload played a role in the crashes, and the MAX will remain grounded until training issues are dealt with:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKBN1WJ2IU
Global regulators are looking at “startle factors” that can overwhelm pilots as they consider revised protocols for the Boeing 737 MAX, Nicholas Robinson, the head of civil aviation for Transport Canada, told Reuters on Friday.
Boeing Co’s fastest-selling jetliner, the 737 MAX, was grounded worldwide in March after two fatal crashes that killed a total of 346 people within five months.
Pilot overload appears to have played a role in both crashes, in which crews struggled to regain control of the airplane while a new flight control system repeatedly pushed the nose down amid a series of other audio and sensory alarms and alerts.
“What we need to do is ensure that the aircrew in the MAX are able to handle that environment,” Robinson said in an interview with Reuters.
Transport Canada is among a core group of regulators that is evaluating the requirements for the 737 MAX to fly again after a seven-month grounding.
Their decisions could lead to sweeping changes to pilot flight operating manuals and classroom instruction and even mandates for costly simulator training, industry sources have said. However, no training decisions can be made until Boeing submits software updates to the FAA for review and approval, Robinson said.
Transport Canada is closely aligned with the European Union Aviation Safety Agency on return to service demands and has also raised questions over the architecture behind the 737 MAX’s angle of attack system.