Originally Posted by
GlobalNav
Not saying that any system is perfect, but oversight needs to be substantial, not merely clerical. Delegated engineering representatives need to expect anything they do being checked by technically competent regulators, even if a relatively small fraction of their work will be. The difference in the business metrics between manufacturer and regulator is a safety advantage, not a detriment.
Last year I saw a paper presented at an avionics conference that talked about how in the future regulators were going to have to rely more on the OEs for compliance. Trust relationships with demonstrated results to reduce the regulators involvement. Due to limited resources (manpower, expertise) of the regulators (and the governments that fund them), the pace of technical change, and the shear number of products seeking certification.
"To create a more flexible, efficient, and safer system, certification authorities worldwide are transforming oversight based on transactions to oversight based on collaboration and shared risk. The aviation industry is also transforming to more self-guided responsibilities. The applicant and the regulators have begun a transition to a state which has
progressively less direct involvement of the regulators in the compliance activities of the applicant."
At the same conference there was an interesting paper on the failings of DO-178 and how it interacted with the safety process. In particular how it's up to the software engineers to determine when requirement changes need to go back and be evaluated by the safety process.