THE boofhead has many perfectly valid points about poorly trained front office staff. The first crew LI did not know that there was software code called MCAS that would repeatedly deflect the barndoor sized HS into the airstream driving the nose down. There was a procedure for that, but their lack of prior knowledge that MCAS was even there as well as the multiple spurious alarms and warnings led to an accident. The ET crew should have known about MCAS from the AD that was issued after Indonesia. Yet they still got terribly confused, almost disoriented, allowing their aircraft to accelerate past VNE never reducing thrust. I have heard the excuses for keeping TO thrust... hot, high, and heavy along with stick shaker active etc. It has been repeated to the point of becoming trite in different ways..."fly the plane"... "pitch and power"..." power and attitude" etc. Software will get fixed, but the capability of the flight crew needs to be fixed as well.