Tomaski, #2746
‘… a conflict between theory and reality.‘
Humans tend to categorise solutions as either-or, true-false, which in the digital age reinforced with binary thinking.
The reality which we seek is a compromise; the world is uncertain and thus solutions involve managing uncertainty. An alternative definition of risk is the degree of uncertainty which an operator has to manage; forward-looking thinking, opposed to statistical hindsight.
“Man and machine” together, viewed as a system where each element is used proportionately and playing to their strengths.
From this viewpoint the 737 Max could be, and has in this forum, been criticised for misjudged technical uncertainty, and an an unbalanced solution with respect to human intervention (also see NTSB report).
‘… QRC procedures I referenced above, at least five of them have not been presented to me in the sim since my initial checkout some years ago.’
This is a concern; however having encountered the same situation from a serious incident investigation and the regulator, the opinion for ‘Red’ level action was such practice was not to be assumed, nor required (mandated). From this there was a mismatch between what the manufacturer - certification regulator assumed, and the operational - training regulator expected.
‘Egg-box management (ivory towers); is this too an aspect of recent FAA activity.
‘… the key to avoiding the manual trim problem in the 737 is prompt recognition and response.’
I disagree. There could be a suitable balance, providing that with consideration of a range of human contribution - delay / distraction, results in a situation which could still be recovered albeit with great difficulty.
However, it appears that with the Max the trim system can runaway (not MCAS) to a position which in some situations cannot be recovered. This inability is not allowed in certification, particularly when considerating likely human performance. I suspect that this is an aspect of current international discussions - a compromise, a judgement, and uncertainty.