Originally Posted by
alf5071h
We might not be able to avoid wind shear / microburst, although we should make every effort to do so (wind shear avoidance training?).
Runaway trim in the 737 Max is currently not avoidable, and in some circumstances unrecoverable, but could be with a modified trim system.
“Pilot training requirements are not meant to compensate for non-acceptable design on the compliance and safety standpoint.”
I suspect what we have a here is a conflict between theory and reality. Yes, it would be wonderful if aircraft were so reliable that prompt pilot recognition and action were not required in response to an aircraft malfunction. That maybe true someday, but not likely anytime in the near future.
The exact methodology will vary from airline to airline (and from aircraft to aircraft), but at my airline on the 737NG we use a Quick Reference Card (QRC) for critical actions (sometimes referred to as "memory items"). This is in addition to the critical maneuver responses (windshear, GPWS, engine-failure, upset & stall recovery, TCAS response) that must be done promptly without reference to a checklist. This QRC currently has thirteen different procedures, each representing one or more possible aircraft malfunctions, only one of which is Runaway Stabilizer. These procedures have been put in place not so much because of the likelihood of any particular failure, but because of the hazards associated with a delayed response. To the extent that these procedures exist, it is an acknowledgement by both the manufacturer and the certificate authority that there is some non-zero risk of a malfunction, and that prompt action is necessary. Please keep in mind that right now I'm only talking about the 737NG.
From my vantage point (and again, circumstances might vary across airlines), one of the key issues is that the necessary training follow-through is lacking. Of the thirteen QRC procedures I referenced above, at least five of them have not been presented to me in the sim since my initial checkout some years ago. One of those malfunctions is Runaway Stabilizer. Do you see the problem here?
As has been previously stated, the key to avoiding the manual trim problem in the 737 is prompt recognition and response. The way to speed up that recognition and response is through regular exposure and practice. I'm all for a redesign of the system, but in the meantime someone needs to take a hard look at whether the the actual training supports the assumptions built into the procedures.