Originally Posted by
Centaurus
Having long since reluctantly accepted that automation dependency has resulted in lack of skill of some of its pilots to fly an ordinary visual circuit, at least one Australian 737 operator now has the SOP requirement to have final landing flap down and all landing checks completed, while the aircraft is still on the downwind leg of the circuit. This is supposed to ensure the aircraft is stabilised by 1000 ft with all landing checklists completed. In the simulator it was noted pilots were having difficulty coping with manual visual flying and stabilisation requirements.
it’s not too long ago when to pass the initial type rating at a well known UK airline, you did not have to be Chuck Yeager. But, you did have to hand fly a single engine approach at night with no flight directors, on a 737 for real - not a sim - to a landing. Usually best of three at least. So no luck involved. In the sim you had to fly a manual trim landing using only the wheels. And a manual reversion landing. To name but three of about forty demanding routines.
That was just part of the base training then before zero flight time sims. I was a base trainer then and never had to fail a single cadet. They could all do it really well. They had to, to pass. These guys are now captains and they carry that training with them for life. The point is that such skills are quite achievable, but no longer required or demanded. I have said since this thread started that the lack of basic flying skills will be a major factor in the final reports. The MCAS will be a factor of course, but not the cause. MCAS is now fixed- has been for a long time and is stalled out in the certification issues that have arisen. But the elephant in the room is the lack of training to enable an “average” pilot to cope with (multiple) automation failures which will never go away. Put another way, the skill level of the average pilot has to improve. An MCAS style event can be fixed relatively easily as in this case. Conversely, Pilot training is a mammoth task both in retraining perhaps thousands of current newer pilots, and in the future training requirements. Guess which one the industry would rather tackle? Much easier to blame a daft MCAS design and hang the whole thing on Boeing. But it’s not just Boeing. There have been several truly shocking pilot error events like AF447 and Turkish at AMS- you all know them. Caused by inability to comprehend what the plane is actually doing.
If I were head of training in an airline with 737s, (or any type really) I would be right now insisting on extra sim time and extra time on LPC/OPC twice yearly training to raise the bar significantly. And have my pilots ready for the MAX when it returns, as it surely will, some time soon. It won’t be called “MAX” I don’t suppose though.
And passengers would know that the guys on this airline are up to the task.
Y