Originally Posted by
RickNRoll
Why does a modern commercial jet have a flight control system that tries to replicate the behavior of a plane from the 1950's, including a control column that requires a gorilla to pull back on it in extreme flight conditions?
In an attempt to keep this thread partly on track I've managed to make an extract from a WSJ article dated June 19, 2019.
Its a very long article with a lot of detail re the manual trim issue perhaps someone can post a link or make a few ' more ' significant extracts
mainly trying to give a rational perspective
Title Boeing’s Latest 737 MAX Concern: Pilots’ Physical Strength
Turning manual crank during emergency procedure may be too difficult for some people
partial extract from a separate article referenced in the above
FAA experts also aim to study how issues regarding pilot strength were dealt with during certification approvals of older versions of the 737, according to the people familiar with the specifics.
Simulator sessions and flight tests have measured the strength required to turn the crank in various flight conditions for pilots of both genders, according to two of the people briefed on the details.
In a flight-simulator test earlier this month, Journal columnist Scott McCartney and pilot Roddy Guthrie, fleet captain for the 737 at American Airlines, experienced troubles in turning the wheel. Capt. Guthrie couldn’t move the wheel until Mr. McCartney pitched the plane’s nose down, easing some of the pressure on the wheel.
Government and industry experts are considering possible operational, training and pilot-manual changes to resolve safety concerns about the procedure, according to the people familiar with the specifics. The results are expected to be part of a package of revised software and training mandates that the FAA is seen issuing later this summer.
Capt. Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger, the retired US Airways pilot celebrated for his 2009 “Miracle on the Hudson” landing, said Wednesday that pilots should be required to spend time in simulators before the MAX returns to service, not only to review the updates to the MCAS software but to practice situations where manually turning the crank would be more challenging. At higher airspeeds, turning the wheel could require two hands, the efforts of both pilots, or may not even be possible, he said.
“They need to develop a muscle memory of their experiences so that it will be immediately accessible to them in the future, even years from now, when they experience such a crisis,” he said Wednesday at a hearing of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s aviation subcommittee.
Mr. Sullenberger told the committee that he recently experienced a recreation of the fatal MAX flights in a flight simulator. He came away from it understanding how crews could have been overwhelmed by alerts and warnings without enough time to fix the problem.
The former commercial pilot also expressed broader concern about how the MAX was designed and certified by regulators. “It is clear that the original version of MCAS was fatally flawed and should never have been approved,” Mr. Sullenberger said in written testimony.
“The 737 MAX was certified in accordance with the identical FAA requirements and processes that have governed certification of previous new airplanes and derivatives,” a Boeing spokesman said in a statement. He also said the company continues to work on training requirements with global regulators and airlines.
The pending software fix is intended to make it easier for pilots to override MCAS, which moves the horizontal stabilizer to point the nose down