Originally Posted by
Ian W
This is the cognitive overload that NTSB is warning about. And as the repetitious posters above would tell them disregard the noise, 'fly the aircraft' - 'pitch and power' and only then while in control of the situation work out what the automatics are complaining about. This approach would have the advantage of reducing the cognitive overload as the human is doing something meaningful and effective.
Do any airlines train crews to 'fly the aircraft' - 'pitch and power' as a an essential underlying task while running NNCs?
Here is what the NTSB report insists on, and where Boeing and the FAA were wrong : in theory it should have appeared as a trim runaway, but in reality it was totally different.
Emphasis should be place on the fact that the accident aircrews were experiencing
control difficulties beside all the cognitive overload, and ultimately failed to maintain pitch attitude.
The aircraft was
nosing down, the elevator couldn't counter it, and the trim wasn't runaway, it was behaving in a mysterious manner.
Every pilot that experienced or witnessed the situation in the engineering cab (fixed, no g's, no movement), stated that the situation was extremely difficult to manage, even with no stress and knowing in advance what was to take place, and what the solution was.