Ironically, before the MAX the 737 stab trim system had become very reliable and significant problems were very rare. This level of reliability generated a great deal of complacency among both crews and airlines which then led to a lack of regular training with and awareness of potential runaway stab scenarios. This training deficiency can potentially contribute to problems with recognition and delayed crew response.
A runaway stab, and MCAS are fundamentally different events.
For a runaway stab, usually it's a failure of the trim switches. That is - the pilot trims, and releases the switch but the trim keeps running. As the pilot initiated the trimming, a problem is almost automatically assumed to be a trim problem in the pilot's mind and added to the noise of the trim in the otherwise quiet cockpit, the runaway trim is obvious and the correction is instinctive (trim against the runaway - firstly with the switches, secondly manually.)
An MCAS event, however, happens after a stick shaker on the Captain's side, AND unreliable airspeed on the Captain's side - and with all of that going on pulling the pilots eyes away from the centre pedastal to the flying instruments the trim spins (with the noise of that covered by the stick shaker). The fact that this event took two experienced pilots to their deaths shows how different, difficult and dangerous the event is to diagnose in the time available.