Response to above, in no particular order:
Critical action items, sometimes referred to as "memory items", are those steps that flight crews must be able to perform promptly either from memory or by reference to a a quick-reference card generally stored on the glareshield within easy reach of either pilot. There is no "stick shaker" memory item. Rather a stick shaker on takeoff should first be considered an indication of an impending stall (flaps mis-set, incorrect performance data, windshear, etc). If the aircraft performance is normal, then the stick shaker is erroneous and will immediately convert to an "Airspeed Unreliable" scenario for which there is a memory item. It appears that the fact that a bad AOA input can create immediate airspeed and altitude discrepancies was not well understood by average 737 crews. Even after the MAX accidents, I still come across 737 pilots who do not know this. I can only speak for my airline, but I have never seen an erroneous stick shaker on takeoff scenario in the sim, nor have I ever been given any unreliable airspeed problem during takeoff. I have never been taught to associate a bad AOA input with airspeed and altitude discrepancies. As I have mentioned before, whether one is in an NG or a MAX, an AOA failure during takeoff can present a cascading set of issues that can be just as challenging to manage as an engine failure. I would have thought by now there would have been some concerted effort by airlines to educate 737 crews in some of these lessons learned, but I haven't really seen any so far. This is a definite training and education issue.
Runaway Stab Trim has always been (well, at least for a few decades) a memory item on any Boeing aircraft. However, (and again, speaking only for my airline) it is a procedure that has been sorely neglected in training. Prior to the MAX, the 737 stab trim system was incredibly reliable and runaway stab events were rare. Accordingly, in an effort to use sim time more "efficiently," runaway stab problems and the possible issues related to manual trim use were rarely presented to aircrews. I suspect the same was happening at other airlines (other 737 operators, feel free to chime in here). I practice engine failure events during every sim session, and as a result I am well-versed in the immediate actions required. I will suggest here that if Runaway Stab Trim events had been presented to the accident aircrews on a regular basis, then their response to the MCAS malfunction would likely have been different.
As a side note, one would think that any procedure that has critical action items would be presented regularly during simulator sessions. It is not only important to know what steps are required, but to actually perform those steps so there is no question as which controls and/or switches need to be actuated and in what order. Unfortunately, that is not the case. For as long as I have been flying airliners, there has always been one or more "orphan" memory items that are rarely, if ever, presented once the pilot is through initial training.
I can confirm that the manual trim wheel works fine throughout the speed and altitude envelope as long as one keeps the aircraft in trim. Difficulties arise only when one is attempting to trim from an excessive out-of-trim state. The problem has nothing to do with airspeed or altitude, but rather with the amount of elevator deflection being held. The intent of the "roller-coaster" maneuver is to release elevator pressure, thus relieving forces on the jackscrew mechanism, which then decreases the force necessary to turn the manual trim wheel. As long as some nominal amount of climb can be maintained (for an excessive nose-down trim state) or sufficient margin against a stall (for an excessive nose-up state), then the maneuver can be performed successfully.
Last edited by Tomaski; 27th Sep 2019 at 12:29.