Bend alot, #2489,
There have been extensive and knowledgable discussions on a range of possibilities for AoA malfunction in the technical forum.
Without supportive evidence from the investigations, supported by FAA, Boeing, etc, it might not be possible to form a public conclusion about the initiating factor.
There were hints in the proposed modifications, but since the first Boeing submission and FAA rejection, there is an ominous lack of official information.
A possible and highly speculative outcome is that the source or exact nature of the erroneous AoA input is not known, or insufficiently explainable for specific modification; or even unknowable, hidden in the depths of the system interaction.
Thus any solution likened to a ‘wet blanket’ pose considerable problems for certification (not entirely unknown), but also public, world-wide acceptably, led by the FAA with a tarnished credibility.
Gordon, re AoA monitoring.
I agree that safety case for most things can be generated with 20/20. However, given that the Max has sufficient electronic fault identification and logs, it would be practical for the manufacturer to access these in real time (cf Rolls Royce inflight engine monitoring). Even so there are issues of what should be done with the data, who chooses the trip values, and to what objective.
There are proposals for massive ‘reactive’ monitoring (EASA Data4Safety), but apart from the difficulties of managing Big Data, many, - most recent aviation accidents could be rejected as ‘noise in the data’, Black Swans, beyond the limits or assumptions of certification.
Afterall the Max met all requirements - until it didn’t