Originally Posted by
Meester proach
Ohhh , you are my hero.
Its not a case of can’t, it’s a case of “ is it a good idea ?” . That’s airmanship and risk management.
Yanks love their visuals , but it’s always the shorthaul ones doing it who’ve probably only come from Big falls, odawaydahoo.
Predictable anti-Yank snark doesn't change the fact that this Cathay crew had a loss of SA, was well behind their own aircraft, and didn't comply with clearances/instructions they acknowledged. The failure of airmanship and risk management occurred long before the offer of a visual approach to try and salvage the mess was made or the RAs occurred.
Cathay was issued a visual approach for 28L (4:00 minutes into the recording) after they had already stuffed-up the clearance to intercept and capture the electronic guidance/localizer for 28L, a stuff-up that resulted in a loss of separation with UAL on approach to the parallel 28R,
and only after Cathay was asked if they wanted to proceed using one. The reason for controller's visual approach offer was, since Cathay didn't follow their original clearance to join the 28L localizer, because it the only option remaining that would allow Cathay to maneuver back to the left for 28L. The offer and question...not the clearance...for a 28L visual approach came at 3:45, after which Cathay responded they could indeed continue using one. Only then (at 4:00), was the visual approach clearance issued to Cathay accompanied by the controller's re-iteration that they were to proceed to 28L and UAL was on 28R.
To review what led up to it.
Cathay was being vectored to 28L and given a heading of 010 which they acknowledged but didn't execute. When finally prompted by the controller to verify they were turning, Cathay asked for the controller to repeat the heading. The controller then asked them for a "sharp turn" (due to not following the previous vector) to the new heading of 330. At 1:32 Cathay was then given a heading of 310
and clearance to intercept the localizer for 28L, which Cathay acknowledged and read back correctly at 1:35. However, instead of following what they were cleared-for and read back, they proceeded to blow through the 28L localizer and encroached on the approach path for 28R.
Prior to that and before where the localizer intercept was to occur, the UAL traffic was pointed out to Cathay by the controller which Cathay acknowledged they had visually. Cathay was told that that UAL traffic was for 28R and instructed to maintain visual separation from them, which is a standard ATC instruction in VMC conditions when approach paths are in close proximity. At 1:58 the controller first pointed out the UAL traffic on approach stating it was on the approach for 28R.
Cathay acknowledged they had them visually at 2:05 and, after a repeat of the subsequent instruction, at 2:23 read back/acknowledged the instruction to maintain visual separation. However, they obviously failed to comply.
At 1:35 Cathay was issued and acknowledged the final vector and clearance to intercept 28L localizer. At 2:25 while on that heading, they acknowledged visual contract with traffic for the parallel runway and the instruction to maintain visual separation. The failure to intercept the localizer/final approach course for 28L and encroachment into 28R's occurred 40 seconds later at about 3:05.
The real question(s) is why didn't the Cathay crew comply with simple ATC vectors to intercept the localizer for 28L and, after acknowledging they had visual contact with traffic on a parallel runway (28R) and would maintain visual separation, blew through their final approach course to wind up underneath that other traffic lined-up for 28R. It's as if they thought they were landing on 28R, tuned the wrong freq, and never looked out the window again.
All the babble of visual approaches (initially when offered in this case a simple side-step while still above 2,000') being undoable, the supposed superiority of UK controllers over US controllers, the "dangerousness" of SFO, what UAL should have done, ULH willy-waving, etc etc completely misses the point. One would think on a professional pilot forum that pilots at least would be able to recognize where the snowball began to roll downhill and address/discuss the possible how and why it did. We're left with only possibilities since with no CVR leading up to the breakdown we can only suppose what was briefed and expected and to what degree by the crew long before this recording begins, but obviously it went to hell.