Mindful of the admonition that fools rush in where angels fear to tread, first let me repost a comment I made in a related thread....
Originally Posted by
Tomaski
I am cautious about wading into the commentary about the Langewiesche NYT article, but I'm going to suggest that there is a middle ground here.
There is an old saw that goes something like, "What you see depends heavily on where you stand." Different people can look at the information surrounding the MAX crashes through different lenses and come away with different viewpoints. That's not necessarily a bad thing. Accident investigations provide the opportunity to identify multiple ways in which the aviation system can be improved, even if there is disagreement regarding the primary causes.
I read the article through several times and I'll admit that I don't agree with everything Langewieshe says, but I don't disagree with all of it either. Clearly, Boeing fell far short of everyone's expectations in how they rushed through the MAX design and production process. Just as clearly, these accidents demonstrated that there is significant room for improvement in regulatory oversight, aircrew training, aircraft maintenance, and overall corporate (both airline and manufacturer) attitudes toward safety. All of these areas need work, so there is no need to pick and choose. Boeing absolutely needs to step up and fix their design process. The FAA and other certificate authorities absolutely need to step up and improve their oversight. By the same token, airlines also need to re-evaluate their aircrew training and aircraft maintenance practices with an particular eye toward improving safety as opposed to minimizing costs. It all needs work, so I really don't think it is necessary to emphasize one problem area at the expense of another.
I will add the observation that even if everyone on the planet concurs that the Boeing's design lapses (and subsequent "approval" by the FAA) was, without question, the
primary cause of these accidents, there is still valid reasons to examine the factors related to aircrew training, aircraft maintenance, and corporate culture that have come to light. If one were to play a thought experiment and read Langewieshe article through the lens of an "alternate universe" in which there was a different aircraft malfunction involved and perhaps a less lethal outcome, I believe he provides a fair amount of anecdotal evidence there are serious issues with how some airlines put cost cutting ahead of safety. I think it would be a great disservice to ignore these warning signs because one or more of these lapses could very well become the primary causes of some future accident.
If nothing is done
now when there is clear evidence of a problem, what are we to say
later to the families of the next victims?