Originally Posted by
OldnGrounded
(Not sure whether this should be here or in the ongoing MAX thread.) Posted to the Times website a couple of hours ago:
A great development.
However,
Boeings real problems are not in the aircraft, they are in the corporate managements failure to live up to their code of ethics. When they do an RCA and ascertain why they elected to act as they did with the QA engineers that discovered the non compliant parts being put onto the first years of the NG production from their supplier, then perhaps they will be able to implement appropriate changes. They appear to only respond to adverse outcomes instead of being proactive in maintaining the ethical standards that once upon a time they were famous for, rather than being infamous.
Boeing has the technical competency and the ability to be innovative if they choose to be. For the last 40 years, a great deal of the innovation has been acquired by takeovers of other companies and their programs, which achieves the desired outcome, but can lead to organisational problems. However, the .767 Tanker ethics issues, the 737 production non compliance and their response, the MAX, 767 FOD, 787 production line concerns point to corporate changes being necessary. Boeing is still a global leader, but they could be working towards being the supplier of last resort as competent alternatives to their programs exist.
The legacy holdover of the 737 has been forced mainly by the airlines, and that is probably reaching a logical end following the MAX debacle. Airbus went a smarter route with the CCQ, Boeing needs to go back to some basic assumptions as to what needs to be taught, and consider green field designs in the future that train for necessary differences, which frankly has little to do with flying the aircraft, it has a lot to do with the system architecture, for which the crew need a modicum of knowledge. To avoid excessive training overhead, the current variant, MAX holds over outdated system architecture. Yet the MAX event resulted from a lack of knowledge of the crew as to the existence and the function of the MCAS, and the historical issues with the manual trim, which would appear to contradict a position suggesting that generic training is appropriate. Each systems FMA should be fully known by the manufacturer, at the time of design. That would result in a requirement to observe a fault, and respond accordingly. MCAS was an "unknown unknown"... a failure of the FMA process in the design of the system.
Applying (or mis-applying) the Pareto Rule, 20% of operators will benefit from having highly detailed knowledge on the systems and design, the other 80% want to know what page to turn to in the QRH. 100% are required by operating protocol to adhere to the QRH, and not go out doing heroic intervention from the get go. It is interesting to note that culturally, the groups that want or expect greater background information are those that also have the highest levels of individualism and the lowest level of compliance with formal procedures.
The fundamental problem is not a technical issue, that is the glaring consequence. The problem is a cultural one that has been growing in extent for decades, and has been spack filled by the corporation to date.
COOB, fix the root cause, stop fluffing around on the periphery of the problem; Nero's fiddle playing didn't help Rome (1).
time for a Sapporo
(1) In July, 64 A.D., the fiddle didn't exist, but citharas did. Nero had sung on sacking Troy, and Tacitus appears to have conflated the two by his writings:
"pervaserat rumor ipso tempore flagrantis urbis inisse eum domesticam scaenam et cecinisse Troianum excidium, praesentia mala vetustis cladibus adsimulantem", [‘the rumour had spread that, at the very moment when Rome was aflame, he had mounted his private stage, and, assimilating the ills of the present to the calamities of the past, had sung the Destruction of Troy’]. Nero was 30 miles from Rome when the 6 day fire of July started ... but legend gives the parable of his playing an instrument that didn't exist for another millennia, a behaviour that is contrary to accounts by others at the time of his leadership in combatting the conflagration. However, it is a simple parable describing inappropriate interventions.