Originally Posted by
Wunwing
I suspect that the answer to the last questions are to be answered by the fact that the sister ship to the accident aircraft is currently operating in Australia and both pilots may be the normal crew on the Australian aircraft???
If the accident report says that they hadn't flown a Convair for 17 months ,then it seems wrong. Maybe not an SA registered Convair?
In the world of rare historic aircraft operations, its normal for crews to keep recent on foreign aircraft. I know that both the Swiss Connie and Lufthansa 1649 crews kept recent on the HARS Connie.
Wunwing
The report isn't clear. For example, in the conclusions:
3.2.4 Both pilots last flew the Convair 340/440 aircraft 17 months prior to the accident flight, therefore, none of the crew complied with the 12-month competency check.
But in the flight crew information section contradictory information is given; the PFs logbook indicated 5.9 hours on type in the last 90 days (the PM's logbook wasn't found). But the same section
also says
According to the PF’s logbook, the PF last flew the Convair 340/440 on 27 February 2017. ??
Still, none of this takes away from the fact that the pilots were fully aware the left engine was on fire but took no actions to deal with it. They had observed that the engine had low MAP before V1 but elected to continue. Once the fire was obvious, the LAME handed the PM the AFM QRH but the PM "ignored it", to quote the report. It must be said though that the LAME was manipulating the engine controls, not the pilots. The fire melted out the rivets securing the left wing's aileron cable pulleys which resulted in the cable going slack and the left aileron rising, as seen in the video. They lost roll control & lift, on top of the drag of the burning engine which they never feathered or secured.
The engine caught fire because the LAME didn't service it properly, missing that no. 7 cylinder's exhaust valve was cracked and partly missing its head. The cylinder head cooling fins softened and failed and the combustion flame escaped the engine. No 13's piston rings had also failed and were no longer sealing; that didn't cause the fire but it and no. 7's damaged exhaust valve did drop the MAP.
The programmed maintenance performed a few days before the flight called for compression testing of each cylinder on both engines but the LAME patently didn't do this.
The engine had been showing low MAP on two previous flights but the LAME removed the gauge each time and sent them to another AMO, who both times recorded that it was blocked with carbon deposits and cleaned it out, rather than compression testing the engine.