PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 5th Sep 2019, 12:33
  #2186 (permalink)  
Peter H
 
Join Date: Jun 2008
Location: Cambridge UK
Posts: 162
Originally Posted by groundbum View Post
it's clear MCAS needs it's own switch so it can be turned off yet electric trim stay available to the pilots. This, along with the AOA disagree light, and knowledge of MCAS, would most likely have prevented the 2 accidents so far.G
An idea which seems to offer an easy path to two incremental improvements.

1) If you keep the operation of this switch to the fixed wiring (i.e. computer-out-of-loop) the need for low-latency MCAS-deactivation
computer responses seem to go away. So no need to add another computer, and its inherent complications?

2) If the switch is automatically hardware-toggled by emergency-level pulling on the stick, then its operation doesn't require deep
analysis of the situation. So a fast response with limited training, even in the presence of distracting alarms?

Last edited by Peter H; 5th Sep 2019 at 12:41. Reason: Punctuation
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