Originally Posted by
chevvron
I don't get your point; controllers in France (so I'm told) routinely identify aircraft who call them requesting Flight Information Service; once identified the height readout MUST be verified and thereafter, traffic information and (when necessary) advisory avoiding action is passed.
In the UK, controllers MUST identify and verify altitude readout for traffic requesting TS or DS unless the identity is transferred from another radar unit who will have already done this. Traffic requesting Basic service ie what used to be called Flight Information Service MAY be identified and if so, any altitude readout associated with their SSR must be verified. Thereafter even this traffic may be passed generic information on possible conflicting traffic especially when 'duty of care' requires it ie if you see a 'dead ringer' for your traffic you should tell the pilot about it rather than sit there and do nothing.
In the case quoted at Bournemouth, even though the Falcon was only on Traffic Service in the Initial Approach phase, NOT the Final Approach stage, he was identified so the controller could have offered advisory avoiding action (traffic is in your ......, if not sighted suggest left/right heading...) or if the confliction looked serious, upgraded the Falcon to De-confliction service and passed avoiding action prior to passing the traffic information.
Chevron, my point is simple and has nothing to do with the a/c you ARE talking to - which as you say is validated, verified etc. - but the ones that you are NOT talking to. How can you give SENSIBLE Deconfliction and/or Traffic information to the one you are talking to, against the one that you are not? Now, I know that you can obviously but it gets messy with words such as "indicating" and "altitude unverified" etc being used. In the Bournemouth incident the controller did not know for sure what level the Mooney was at. He had to make assumptions. (One I heard at work recently while the radar ATCO validated and verified was 1000 feet lower than the pilot reported as he checked in! A pretty clueless piece of airmanship from the pilot to call at 1800' when he was at 800'. Altimeter incorrectly set !!!) To get the job done properly you need to either be talking to everyone, to be confident that you can see on radar (or know about if procedural) all the traffic that is out there and/or be sure that they are where they say they are both horizontally and vertically. Right? So, what is really the point of EASA class E as far as Air traffic Control services are concerned, when VFR don't need to talk to you, don't need to have a functioning transponder and can do what they like? Surely this is identical to the current situation with ATSOCAS in class G? Now, if you add a TMZ to the class E at least you have another layer of security.