I'm amazed.
I read the NY Times article before I came to this thread as a result, it had the ring of truth then and still does.
Maybe someone who knows the chapter and verse on Airbus product can help me, but I understood the design philosophy behind the whole FBW concept was that the computer control laws were such that they prevented inputs that would exceed the aerodynamic and structural envelopes.
That is, short of turning all the protections off it was almost impossible to "kill" the aircraft.
If I understood it correctly, this was supposed to allow higher design and structural limits and expand flight and stability envelopes to promote the overall operating economics.
Or is it that they'll only keep you safe as long as you remain within "normal limits" and in anything other set of conditions you are out there on your own <img src="frown.gif" border="0"> <img src="confused.gif" border="0">
I find the concept of training to one set of training skills for say engine failure, viz use of rudder and a different set for inflight excursiona in the after take off segment, ie. not use of rudder because we'll come to bits, difficult to grasp.
BEagle suggests, properly, that use of rudder "in flight";
"other than for spin recovery or to counter the initial effect of loss of engine thrust at high thrust settings" should be avoided.
Difficult to argue with that, but given that the wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft has been accepted as the event initiator, (?)
it is possible that the resulting aircraft behaviour that prompted the pilot inputs could have exhibited either of those effects (spin onset or large "apparent" assy).
Who amongst us wouldn't have reacted instinctively with rudder and/or who amongst us would have been aware of the apparent consequences.
Are we that far out on the "pushing the certification limits" bough that a single moments inattention by a pilot will break it off.
Only two things can operate here.
Either the certification process needs a seriously vigourous rethink and overhaul, and a seriously deep audit of the control laws.
or,
A couple of pilots are being hung out to dry for "killing" an aircraft by using control inputs made available to them by the computer controlled flight control system that they believed provided such protection and limits.
Either way?