Originally Posted by
tdracer
Considering that I was personally responsible for certifying TCMA on the 747-8, the constant sarcasm/criticism is getting pretty close to being personal.
Hans has already crossed that line...
Originally Posted by
tdracer
TCMA uses multiple air/ground sources to determine 'on-ground'. Default is air. It's resident in the FADEC software and DAL A s/w (which MCAS wasn't).
I'm not familiar with the specifics of the 787 TCMA, but on the 747-8 TCMA uses three radio altimeter and two WOW signals. At least three signals must indicate ground, with at least one each from the Radio Altimiter and WOW.
So, was definitely not trying to get personal, your input on these forums is very much appreciated by me.
It definitely sounds like B took the right approach with the amount of inputs to prevent problems here.
I was just pointing out that there have been a few times were B could have done better, specifically on the 737. The THY crash in AMS happened because the pilots were asleep AND because the AT only looked at one RA input. B could have taken the hint, and not have changed from the original MCAS on the KC-46 that used both AOAs to use only one AOA on the 737. Getting a stick-shaker on one side because that side has a failed AOA??? Maybe I should not have commented on this specific issue, but B has had a thrust reverser deploy in the air, with a subsequent design change, and it looks like it might have to do some work on MCAS for the 737. I am on the A320, and there is a LOT of things I wish were done the Boeing way*), but having a vote between 3 systems for most things is a plus.
*):
-side-sticks not interconnected
-throttles not moving
-VNAV not arming
-can't update descend profile after TOD
-will disregard restrictions on the arrival because it "thinks" it's on the approach
-ASO