Originally Posted by
john_tullamarine
As I read the story, the problem was associated with LSS - ie stick force perceptions in pitch at the pilot level - rather than stall per se.
Both the long threads have had good posts which refute the idea that MCAS was developed as an anti-stall system.
Above is another excellent post from Tomaski. I recall at the beginning of the original thread a rather ill-tempered argument developing because a lot of people were saying that the dead pilots should have "just flown the airplane". I think Tomaski has explained very clearly why that is not a fair judgement or expectation because of the complexity of the cues the pilots were receiving, their lack of understanding of what MCAS was trying to do and how to stop it, and the current methods of training which, as Tomaski explains, do not give pilots experience of handling unexpected complex problems.
But agreeing with Tomaski does not absolve Boeing and the other manufacturers of responsibility for the general state of pilot training. The aircraft manufacturers must at some level of their organisations have an informed view of the sort of training they would like pilots to have but instead of insisting on this they seem to be willing to accept the degradation which Tomaski has described. Boeing definitely (as I see it) went one step too far when they said the MAX is just another 737 and all pilots need is some time on an ipad instead of a proper conversion course. I'm hopeful the accident reports will tell the truth about that fatal error of judgement by Boeing. If they do then the grounding will extend until the engineering solutions have been crystalised, enough MAX simulators are available, and enough pilots have done a conversion course on them.
Perhaps an additional year of grounding?
And one other thing. There has a been a lot of talk on PPRuNe about designing commercial aircraft so that they can be flown by the average pilot. This is nonsense. A commercial aircraft should be capable of being flown by the
worst pilot who chances to sit in the cockpit. It's not true that half of all pilots will be below average because that assumes a normal bell curve of competence where competence is plotted on the x axis. In practice I suspect the curve is an "S" with more pilots above the average which is dragged down by the worst pilots on the left hand side of the curve. And in this context "worst" does not refer to aptitude alone, it also includes experience.
The Ethiopean airlines first officer with 361 hours total time, who appears to have been given control at the critical juncture, might have been a bright star with a natural talent for flying but the fact is he had 361h TT. If the aviation industry thinks that a pilot with that level of experience is OK then planes MUST be designed so that such pilots are capable of flying them.
As it happens I think Ethiopean airlines and everyone else who thinks 361 hours is enough experience to fly a big jet is barmy, or venal, one or the other, but that's irrelevant. Planes must be designed so that they can be flown by the worst pilot who will fly them, and worst includes least experienced. If that is too difficult because of the level of (in)competence presented by the worst pilots, or the least experienced,
then pilot training must be improved to a level where even the worst pilot
is capable of flying the planes.