Originally Posted by
boofhead
I disagree that it takes an above average pilot to fly these, or most aircraft and certainly all airliners must be able to be flown by average pilots. All pilots of all skill levels should be trained and able to follow the emergency procedures for their aircraft. Does anyone disagree with that?
I would be ashamed, as a pilot, to blame my failures on the aircraft. If I could not fly the aircraft safely I would go sell insurance or houses or something more suited to my skills.
Boof,
I am reminded of a Yogi Berra quote that goes something like this, "In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is.”
I understand where you are coming from and in theory I agree that flight crews must possess a high degree of knowledge regarding both systems and procedures and must be able to act on that knowledge promptly even when under pressure. That said, it must be recognized that three different crews did not connect the MCAS malfunction with the Runaway Stab Trim procedure in the manner that Boeing expected when the system was being designed. Why was that the case?
I have suggested that a big part of the reason for this discrepancy has been a multi-decades drift between the the expectations (“theory") baked into the 50-year old 737 design (and still held among the engineering staff at Boeing) and the “practice" of how pilots are actually trained and managed in the field. At many airlines pilot training has largely become an actuarial driven event where the priority is on filling squares at the lowest cost and not necessarily achieving a deep understanding or proficiency. To use a sports-related analogy, it is as if a group of football players were given a number of preset drills in an empty stadium consisting of passing, shooting, ball-handling, etc, but no actual scrimmaging because it would “cost” too much to set up. To no one’s surprise, this team may perform very well in the controlled environment of the practice field, but still fall apart when they have to deal with actual defenders and the distractions of a stadium crowd.
Specifically to these MAX events, yes there were malfunctions that could reasonably be classified as a Runaway Trim event for which there was a well-established procedure. However, there was not only an ongoing sensor failure (the AOA vane) that generated not only multiple warnings but also a simultaneous Unreliable Airspeed event which is a challenging malfunction in its own right. So wrapped up in this “straightforward” Runaway Trim scenario was a combination of 1) surprise, 2) distraction, and 3) multiple non-normals which all had to be managed with every piece of automation stripped away.
For those of us who have been around commercial aviation for a few decades, some of us remember when 1) surprise, 2) distraction, and 3) multiple malfunctions were on the menu for every simulator session - with the autopilot off for much of the time. Not anymore.
Airlines no longer train crews to manage simultaneous emergencies. Just about every event is pre-briefed with known expectations for the pilot response. Malfunctions are presented “cleanly" without any distractors. Once the situation is stabilized, the autopilot is engaged. It’s all about hitting the required training points and moving on to the next one. Suggestions for more realistic training are disregarded or deemed too expensive. Yes, a highly motivated pilot can still spend many hours of their own time attempting to make up for these training gaps, but there is also the attitude that if their employer doesn’t seem to care why should they? Maybe not the most professional attitude, but pilots are still human beings. This has been my experience at a reasonably well-regarded “developed world" airline.
As far as actual flight operations, that’s a mixed bag. I will say that at mine and many other airlines, the Captain still has reasonably broad discretion to act in the best interests of the flight. Yes, procedures are still expected to be known and followed, but it is still recognized that a procedure cannot be written for every circumstance. This is not true of every airline. Some airlines are not only extremely procedure driven, but also operate in a background culture of strong lines of authority and a very jaundiced view of individual initiative. Expecting some of these pilots to go "outside the box" when presented with a novel malfunction is perhaps unrealistic. Throw in explicit or implicit expectations that crews use the highest level of automation at all times (thus degrading basic flying skills) and you have a recipe for disaster when the unexpected happens.
So back to the sports analogy. If the players are not being properly taught to deal with the circumstances they might find on the field of competition, is the problem with the players or the coaches?
If Boeing, and possibly the FAA, are making certain assumptions regarding pilot knowledge and proficiency, what are they actually doing to ensure that those assumptions are justified? And if those assumptions are no longer valid, should they change the training and experience requirements to match the aircraft design, or should they change the aircraft design to match the state of training and experience (or some of both)?
The cynic in me says they will do a little of both simply for
PR reasons, but don’t expect any major changes because it will be just too damned expensive. Some actuarial type is sure to point out that aviation is still very safe compared to the alternatives, we really don’t kill that many people each year, memories are short, and all that extra training and/or robust re-design work is going to take a huge chunk out of the cash flows.
I hope I’m wrong, but history isn't encouraging.