An alternative view, maybe; or some home truths which if left unsaid …
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“… the situation of Boeing 737 MAX is less bright than expected. My previous piece on the subject demonstrates excessive optimism in hindsight. As always, things are more complex than they appear.
One lesson that I get from here is that avionics engineers should be aerospace engineers and not electronics / computer engineers or even worse, software programmers. These people need to understand fully how and why does an aircraft fly and what are all possible consequences of their software and hardware design and malfunctions. They should be educated in the cult of absolute responsibility and in the spirit of low margin aerospace engineering.”
“Certification process of a new type of aircraft should be taken very seriously. FAA, EASA and other national authorities have a major responsibility to the flying public, otherwise the confidence in air travel gets thin, in spite of the asymmetrical efforts for superb safety performance that this industry is capable of. My opinion is that EASA should have been particularly pro-active with 737 MAX cutting corners of certification. EASA should watch FAA and vice versa, they should back each other up. Apart from grounding the plane two days earlier, EASA did not do much on the 737 MAX. If I can understand the delegation principle and the motivation of the FAA to promote US aircraft types, EASA should be motivated differently, and thus provide some balance.”
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