PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 14th Aug 2019, 10:09
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Maninthebar
 
Join Date: Apr 2018
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Originally Posted by safetypee


Apparently the autopilot / auto trim has the ability to trim over full range. This is ambiguous; either as required for autopilot control - stay in trim, but not manual trim cert requirements. Also, this could invalidate the safety inhibition as above - trim is still electrically enabled, and ‘if so’, and ‘if’ MCAS was routed via the ‘auto’ FCC, then it could electrically signal the tail to move in conditions which the stick trim could not.

Reference to ‘aisle stand trim switches’ is confusing, perhaps trim wheel.

https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/def...20ISS%2010.pdf Page 15
Thank you both for your replies.

So.....it COULD be that MCAS is able to trim the surface beyond the point at which the electric trim switches were inhibited.

Understood that the auto trim should not have been allowed to run that far without 'contradiction, though acknowledging that MCAS drive auto-trim drives the surface ~50% faster than the manual electric trim
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