Easy Street
So carriers are too vulnerable as there is too high an air/missile/submarine threat, but are not needed to counter these threats as other assets will? Is it me?
I think that the RN has always has task group operations in mind. Carrier Enabled Power Projection is so much more than jets using the carrier as a launch pad for ground attack. Assuming that someone else will defend your task force is a recipe for ships sunk, dead people, and strategic failure. You say the decline of the high speed interceptor and the rise of CIWS..... but not in the minds of top tier navies.
1. Perhaps the US Navy and the PLAN are bad examples. What about France, Spain, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore.....?
2. I posted the page from the
Eisenhower Strike Group as it shows that ships other than the carrier provide capabilities in their own right, and the carrier provides fighters for air defence and helicopters for ASW.
3. The evidence suggests that without the carriers, that idiot Cameron would have demanded that another five frigates be cut. If same that idiot had not been a cowardly weasel and allowed the RN an uplift of 1500 or so bods as part of SDSR 1500, we would not be having many manpower issues. The argument that they have called the cutting of other ships, or personnel, does not hold water.
4. Is a carrier the only type of high value unit? Would losing an LPD full of marines, or a couple of STUFT/charted vessels full of troops and there equipment be any less shocking to the UK or NATO?
5. Your assertion that
"With modern technology the best way is to ignore the launch aircraft and deploy an effective, sustainable counter-missile capability" does not make sense. It will get people killed. Ever heard of
Kill the Archer, not the Arrows? Why on Earth do you think it is better to ignore the aircraft, and deal with a greater number of harder to hit targets, at closer range.
The former Maritime Warfare Centre Analyst
I put your assertion to explained it more eloquently (and diplomatically) than I could:
The earlier you can break the "kill chain" the better. What's often overlooked is the value of shipborne fighters for taking out enemy recce: when all they know is "there's a carrier out there somewhere, and our scouts don't come back from this general areas so it's probably around there..." it's not easy to launch a co-ordinated strike when you've got only a vague idea of where your target might be.
Similarly, a co-ordinated strike with scouts, SEAD, and strikers is a nasty threat - but if the scheduling's been spoiled because different groups were dodging Meteors on the way in, that helps the ships defending (and extra warning time means more chance to optimise ASMD stationing, course and speed, and to get confusion and distraction measures in place.)
Then, there's the point that (for instance) a Su-35 can handily carry four AS-17 missiles; I'd rather splash one aircraft than have four supersonic missiles to deal with (not that we can't, but it burns through the magazine faster than you'd like). Even a failed engagement where the enemy evades and escapes, means they've jettisoned their expensive ordnance and that's four fewer missiles reaching the MEZ.
The fighters aren't likely to obliterate the entire raid, but they can make it a lot easier to survive.
6. Anti Submarine Warfare is likely to be needed to protect things like amphibious forces and crisis response shipping. This demands ASW helicopters. Due to the lack of frigate/destroyers, the communications and coordination issues of helicopters operating from different ships in ones (or twos), and the operating limits of smaller hulls in heavy seas, you tend towards operating increasing number of them from a larger ship - very much like a carrier. The Royal Navy and United States Navy consider that task group ASW is one of the roles of a carrier.
This
Cold War ASW tale may interest you:
Our bread & butter was the so-called "Ripple 3"; 3 aircraft airborne all the time (2 on task, with 1 in transit to / from the scene of action) 100+ miles away from the carrier / convoy, sometimes for weeks at a time. I joined 820 NAS / Ark in late-86, and the first thing we did was a major NATO exercise escorting a convoy from Norfolk VA to Harstad in Northern Norway - we had 3 aircraft on task for over 3 weeks, non-stop. I shudder to think how many sonobuoys we "spat" in a 3000+ mile line across the Atlantic. [[b]100+ miles away, by the way, because by then the Soviets had developed long-range missiles that they could fire from e.g. a Charlie class SSN, thus attacking the convoy without having to get all that close - targeting info coming from Russian aircraft, which was one of the original reasons for procuring the Sea Harrier]. It was tiring, but possible to keep it up almost indefinitely - we had 14 crews, and 9 aircraft, so even if you had, say, 4 cabs broken at any time (not uncommon!), there were enough to keep the Ripple going. You got into a rhythm: wake up; eat; brief an hour before take off; fly for 4 hours; debrief [& file your records if you'd come across any real Soviet boats]; go to bed... 6 hours later repeat... and repeat... and repeat...
But if it's an airborne frigate, why do you need 2 on task? Because it gives you much more flexibility; for instance, one of the Soviet tactics was so-called "sprint & drift" - if it thought it had been detected (and if you flew too low they would hear you), the SSN would wind up to 30kts and shoot off 50 miles or so, and then suddenly go completely silent; slow right down and use natural salinity / temperature layers in the water to interfere with sonar. If you only had one aircraft, he would have to be incredibly unlucky for you to keep up with that - effectively his boat simply disappeared. But with two, provided you were worked up and in good practice, one of you could track the boat while it was fast (& noisy) and direct the other to fly ahead... and then swap. If they didn't know you were there, then over time it was possible to get a really accurate picture of where the boat was (all passively) - so one of you would run the plot, and use the other cab as the weapon carrier. Or, if in doubt, direct the other cab into a hover ahead of the target... ping... contact... weapon in the water within seconds before he has time to react.
7. Why do you assume that the only possible hot war will be against Russia or China - ie World War Three against a nuclear armed monolith? Plenty of third world nations are potentially hostile, and busy buying
Kilo class SSKs or Russian jets with anti ship missiles. Theses are far more likely threats. The likes of Saddam Hussein would love to sink an LPD full of Marines, a chartered vessel full of tanks and troops, or splash a Chinook full of troops of to harass and threaten our naval helicopters dealing with submarine and small boat threats.
You might be interested in this commentary about the tanker war in the eighties, which led to international naval deployment. Both the United States and France had carriers deployed: The Tanker War 1980 - 88
Anthony H Cordesman wrote this very analytical chapter with a look and offensive and defensive capabilities and tactics used both Iran and Iraq, and the efforts of the Western navies to counter the threat to shipping: THE TANKER WAR AND THE LESSONS OF NAVAL CONFLICT
andrewn
You do realise that most of the carrier build was in English (not Scottish) shipyards? It does not matter how times you stridently say non facts. Nor does using the word 'massive' (apologies if it was not you) change the fact that planning for CVF started in the nineties when RN carriers were operationally busy in the Adriatic
and the Arabian Gulf, but their small size limited both the number of aircraft that could be operated and the sea conditions in which flying operations could be safely conducted.
Times are changing, and Western nations must once again look to protect their ability to protect both normal seaborne commerce and crisis response shipping. NATO still depends on trans-Atlantic resupply, the global economy depends of moving things by sea, and any response to a crisis will involve shipping.