PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 13th Jul 2019, 15:20
  #1352 (permalink)  
walkon19
 
Join Date: Jul 2019
Location: itsthewater
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Solution could be a sensor that is not affected by FOD. When performing a systems analysis FMEA and determine an item is critical, the people analyzing can drive themselves crazy trying to find the perfect solution.
Such as an Inertial unit similar to that used on 777-787 ?

Introducing the 787 Tom Dodt

http://www.ata-divisions.org/S_TD/pd...ngtheB-787.pdf



Chief Engineer - Air safety Investigation

ISASI september 2011

Pages 39 thru 41




Common Mode Hazards to Pitot-Static sensors

- Mud Daubers

- Icing
- Hail
- Birds
- Taped Static Ports


- Volcanic Ash

- Radome failure

- Pitot covers

- Maintenance errors (pneumatic plumbing)

787 new capabilities for protection - Synthetic airspeed

- GPS altitude
- Common Mode Monitor





Calculated from angle of attack and inertial data




- AOA – voted dual sensors plus inertial data

- Accurate Coefficient of Lift (CL)
- Airplane Mass from FMC - Validated after Takeoff


Algorithm developed for enhanced stall protection

Avoid displaying data known to be bad
- Loss of valid voted VCAS = Display synthetic airspeed VSYN - Loss of valid voted PSTATIC = Display GPS altitude

Last edited by walkon19; 13th Jul 2019 at 15:33. Reason: add pdf file
walkon19 is offline