PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 8th Jul 2019, 15:39
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yoko1
 
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Originally Posted by Maninthebar

You have asserted that false MCAS activation should be detected by crew as an instance of Runaway Stab Trim in a straightforward way. Others disagree.
Actually what I have asserted, and continue to assert, is that 1) the Main Electric Trim controlled by the pilot’s yoke switch trumps every other electric trim input including MCAS, 2) and if the pilot does not like where the stab trim is or where it is going, then the solution is immediately available under his/her thumb.

Furthermore, this trim state is not some number read off some gauge - it is an always present tactile sensations. If the pilot is really hand-flying the aircraft, if the pilot is really trying to place the aircraft attitude in a specific place to achieve a specific result, then the pilot will feel the control pressures. If the control pressures are not what the pilot wants, then the pilot needs to do something about it. Once the aircraft is stabilized, then the crew has the opportunity to address the malfunction. We can disagree on whether the crew would recognize the Runaway Trim procedure as the best tool to handle the malfunction, but I’m pretty sure they would find their way to those cutout switches eventually. The key is to do so from a stabilized platform.

A good analogy to this situation would be attempting to ride a strong-willed horse who wants to go somewhere different than the rider. Just because you are holding the reins doesn’t mean you are in control of the horse. An experienced rider will keep a firm hold on those reins and make the horse go where he/she wants. An inexperienced rider will be driven around by the horse. What’s the solution? Give the rider more training in how to drive a stubborn horse.
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