PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Old 8th Jul 2019, 15:34
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OldnGrounded
 
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Originally Posted by SteinarN
Very interesting.

So, lets say the pilots mismanages the speed, for example autothrottle disconnected without pilots noticing. Speed decayes, AOA increases, passes MCAS treshold, MCAS start to put in 9 sec of AND trim. So, how should the pilots react now? Should they hit trim cutout after 3 or 4 seconds? How can they know this is a genuine MCAS event and not trim runaway?

This problem clearly needs attention. Something along the lines of a MCAS active aural message, do not hit cutout?
The original question in this subthread:

Originally Posted by Bend alot
If MCAS will still have a maximum 9 second run time and a pilot should cut it in 3 seconds - what is the other 6 seconds of MCAS operation still required for?
As originally conceived, MCAS was intended (effectively) to "correct" pilot input. Since pilots were -- deliberately -- not told even of its existence, it seems pretty clear that it was never anticipated that pilots might need or want to "cut it" -- unless, of course, it was somehow recognized as runaway trim, despite the uncharacteristic behavior.

The awful engineering and terrible operations management associated with this mess are just breathtaking.
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