In other news, the latest from Aviation Week on delays to the MAX re-certification efforts:
Boeing Faces New Hurdle In MAX Recertification Effort
There is some detailed discussion of the test failure of the new FCC software followed by this:
Boeing characterizes the latest finding as “an additional requirement that [the FAA] has asked the company to address through the software changes that the company has been developing for the past eight months,” or since just after the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610. “Boeing agrees with the FAA’s decision and request, and is working on the required software.”
Discovery of the computer-chip issue is the latest, and arguably most visible, item on an extensive list the FAA has flagged in its review of Boeing’s MCAS software changes and of related systems. Not long after the MAX’s grounding, some within the agency expressed confidence that Boeing’s changes, triggered by early findings in the Lion Air accident investigation and well into development, would be finalized by early May. The FAA arranged a May 23 meeting of global regulators in Fort Worth, with the intent of presenting its analysis of Boeing’s changes and justification of why the updates alleviated the U.S. regulator’s concerns about the MAX’s safety.
By early May, however, it became clear the timeline would be stretched. The FAA compiled a list of all the items its separate teams of engineers were working on with Boeing—one source described it as a glorified spreadsheet—and soon realized the project’s scope. More than 200 items were listed, ranging from straightforward questions double-checking facts to queries that required Boeing to make changes.
Of particular interest to recent discussions here is the one item that is conspicuously absent - redesign of the Main Electric Trim system. Granted, Aviation Week doesn't include an itemized list of everything the FAA is looking at, but you would think that these very knowledgeable aviation reporters would certainly realize that problems with this critical system would be a HUGE story worthy of it's own separate treatment. Another dog not barking.
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However, we do have this recent item from the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), discussed extensively in another thread but largely ignored in this one:
Avoidance of Loss of Control In-Flight – Flight Crew Training
Relevant excepts:
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- Loss of Control In-Flight is a significant safety concern and major contributor to worldwide aircraft accidents.
- Over the last five years, there have been number of large commercial air transport aircraft accidents and incidents which were attributed to lack of awareness of the aircraft’s trim condition. Factors which contributed to loss of control in-flight were inappropriate trim inputs or mishandled automatic trim malfunctions, especially during a high energy state or at low altitude, which resulted in excessive elevator or stabiliser load forces.
- The purpose of this Safety Notice is to draw attention to the causes of loss of control in-flight and poor aircraft energy management; and promote the avoidance of undesirable aircraft trim conditions. This is with particular reference to aircraft equipped with conventional trimming systems (i.e. non-fly-by-wire) and aircraft which use manual trim back-up systems in the event of an electronic trim system malfunction. Utilising their Safety Management System (SMS), training organisations, operators and flight crew training departments should identify potential gaps in manual flying skills and intervention methods amongst crews. Particular consideration should be given to type-specific control issues and flight-control downgrade scenarios where manual intervention may not have been comprehensively practised. The effects of startle factor and the crew’s ability to manually control the aircraft in an undesired state when the malfunction/s cannot be accurately diagnosed should be thoroughly evaluated and assessed with training interventions, when required.
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Now THAT is what I call one big, barking dog.