Let's see, caught up with my morning's to-do and I see there's been a few more missives arrive tossed over the transom. How to respond.....
Sock Puppets. Apparently there are sock puppets among us. (Okay, I'll admit I had to go look this one up.) However, that would explain a great deal. Otherwise it is hard to imagine why certain people are trying so hard to deflect culpability away from Ethiopian (and maybe a bit of Lion Air) for their role in these tragedies. Ethiopian in particular has been a case study of "Deny, deny, deny" in regards to concerns with their operation since ET409 first splashed down in the Mediterranean nearly a decade ago. I imagine they have a number suitable english-proficient speakers (or other willing agents) that are more than happy to run cover so as not to endanger their source of low cost pilots and even lower cost training. Now that I think of it, it seems like a lot of airlines would like to deflect attention from the sorry state of their pilot training programs, so this really could be an international conspiracy being coordinated at the highest levels. So everyone please, please be on your guard for posters who rely heavily on emotion, ad hominem attacks, positions that are not supported by evidence, or other attempts to completely derail this thread (and maybe even get it locked out by the moderators).
He's too good. Some posters apparently have issue with the fact that I present articulate, well-researched, and persuasive arguments. I really don't know what to do with this one. I guess I could throw out a few alcohol-fueled, ungrammatical, and largely unstructured missives from time to time if that would balance the scales, but I'm not sure we need more detritus clogging up the threads.
Inside Information. I'll concede that over 30 years of operating heavy metal, to include a number of Boeings, having held a variety of jobs with various aviation-related organizations, and being a long-time subscriber to various aviation publications has given me a depth and breadth of experience that one might classify as unavailable to the average PPruNe denizen. However, aside from the anecdotes from my personal experience, much of the material I cite is available online if you take the time to go looking for it - which I do. There are lots of other people maintaining discussion forums and blogs on the subject with lots of good information (sometimes in other languages, so that's a challenge). Peter Lemme and Bjorn's Corner have been two particularly valuable sources. Maybe it's worth pointing out that all those schematics and technical information that you see popping up both here and on some of these other blogs and online forums are not locked up in Boeing's vault. They are, at a minimum, distributed to every airline that operates their aircraft and many of the vendors who do work for them. There are literally thousands and thousands of people spread across dozens, if not hundreds, of organizations that have access to these specs and are willing to share items of particular interest.
He's trying to pin the blame on the pilots. Yep, one of those useful canards employed by the sock puppets. Just as the MAX was a product of it's design environment, the pilots were a product of their training and organizational environment. If certain airlines took certain shortcuts in hiring and training to save money (can't endanger those management bonuses or investor dividends wasting money on pilot training!), then I think that's worth looking at. I'm going to go out on a limb here and suggest that the reason that none of the crews ever considered the Runaway Stab Trim checklist as a potential solution to the MCAS event was not because of the way the procedure is written (granted, some improvements needed here), but because they were never properly trained on it in the first place. Before MCAS, Runaway Stab Trim had been such an exceedingly rare event that some airlines had relegated the subject to the margins, providing perfunctory training, if at all. I have been on the 737 for quite awhile now, and I have not seen a Runaway Stab Trim drill in the sim for quite a long time, though I suspect that will change next time through the box. So if the pilots were never properly trained in this procedure, and that procedure might have saved the day, where does that responsibility fall? What say you sock puppets?
He posts too often. It seems lately there have been more than a few queries specifically directed at me, so it seems rude not to respond. In fact, one of the critiques posted by someone in the past day or two was that I didn't respond to their question. Damned if I do, damned if I don't. Maybe if I stop responding to the sock puppets.....
The real agenda. There's an old saying in the legal profession that goes, "If the facts are against you, argue the law. If the law if against you, argue the facts. If the facts and the law are against you, throw mud!" It has become quite apparent that certain sacred cows are being crushed under the weight of the accumulating evidence. Rather than deal with that evidence and the (perhaps uncomfortable) direction that evidence is pointing, what we have witnessed in the past 48 hours has been nothing short of a desperate attempt (probably organized by sock puppets) to derail this thread, perhaps even get it locked out by the moderators. I will point out that the title of this is "MAXs Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures" and not "Who is this Yoko1, why does he know so much, and how can we get him to shut up?"
So it's up to you folks. You can let this thread descend into the mud with all these ad hominem attacks that have little to do with the matter at hand and pretty soon we will have another locked thread, or we can keep to the facts and a respectful exchange and maybe we can all learn something.
p.s. For all you sock puppets with stop watches and word counters, the above and immediately following post represent a little over two hours of personal effort. You're welcome.