Originally Posted by
yoko1
They did not properly run the Runaway Stab procedure, they cutout the trim in a significant out-of-trim conditions, and in an act of desperation they restored the malfunctioning system which promptly drove the stab to the stop.
Because they were running the airspeed unreliable checklist with the stick shaker going off! Any reasonably foreseeable single failure that requires the pilots to two concurrent memory checklists close to the ground is not pilot error. Also remember, that it was not until after the fateful ET flight that information about the inability to use the manual trim above ~230 knots without the historical "roller coaster" procedure. None of the three crews had sufficient information provided by the manufacturer about the operation of the MCAS system or manual trim limitations to effectively manage the situation.
I have posted this ad nauseam and will continue to do so. All three crews were faced with this for the entire duration of their flights causing a significant reduction in cognitive capacity and ability to communicate.
I believe a significant number of crews globally, regardless of background, training or experience would have found themselves in very similar circumstances to these two fatal flights because of the interaction between the airspeed unreliable checklist & the inability to manual trim once the MCAS had fired and continued to maintained the stab grossly out of trim. We cannot look at just one of the problems in isolation, what were the crews facing "on the day".