Yes, I'm aware of their comments, but they have nothing to do with the matter at hand. This issue has been addressed numerous times already by others, and repeating the question doesn't change the answer. I suggest you go back and review those responses.
Similarly you overlook that ease of trimming in normal flight conditions might not be the same as in abnormal conditions - extreme tail angles, nor that trimming with an alleviating tail load (nose down) involves different forces against the load in failed conditions (nose up).
Conversely to your previous assertion; there is nothing in the entire history of the 737 trim system since the introduction of the NG (larger tail) that indicates that the Manual Wheel or Electric Trim would be able to recover from high aerodynamic load; excepting what has been deduced from two accidents.
Whereas you fail to qualify your assertion, the opposing argument is that where an aircraft is deliberately mis trimmed and the resultant force held on the control column, it is probable that a limiting force or ability to apply more trim is reached before the physical stops (flight test techniques AC25-7, within the aircraft flight envelope not necessarily at the extremes of physical tail angle).
But if the aircraft is already in a extreme condition, greater that previously identified during flight test to due to a malfunction, then there is nothing to say either way that the aircraft can be recovered - except accidents.
And this is where I need to ask if you understand that there is only one trim motor involved? That motor receives a signal for direction and speed either from an automated source (Speed Trim, Mach Trim, A/P, MCAS) or the pilot yoke switch. In the accident scenario, when MCAS was commanding the stab nose down the forces were
increasing on the jackscrew mechanism. When the pilots were commanding nose up, the forces were
decreasing. If the stab motor was going to stall under an aerodynamic load, it would have happened in the direction of increasing (MCAS), and not decreasing force (pilot trimming). On the contrary, MCAS had absolutely no problem using that one trim motor to drive against an ever increasing force until it hit the physical stops. There is no evidence that the motor was ever overtasked.
Add to this the fact that all the FDR traces for both accident aircraft which occur within the certified flight envelope show a direct match between each pilot trim input (yoke switch) and an actual stab movement. We also have the experience of the penultimate Lion Air flight in which both pilots successfully used the Main Electric Trim to counter MCAS. During the Lion Air accident flight, the Main Electric Trim was successfully used to counter MCAS up to the point that the Captain handed over control to the First Officer. You can't just ignore this evidence because it doesn't fit your narrative.
Finally, let's put ourselves in the place of the Ethiopian and Indonesian investigating authorities. Given the history and cultural inclinations of these two nations, they have great motivation to unearth any exculpatory evidence that would remove pilot actions as a cause of concern. They are in possession of the full set of CVR and FDR data and any relevant physical evidence. They have access to all the subject matter experts. If there was any legitimate evidence that there was a failure in the Main Electric Trim system or that it was unable to stop and counter the MCAS inputs, they would be shouting it from the rooftops. They are not, nor is anyone else.
It is time to move on from this line of argument. It is a dry hole.