Originally Posted by
Speed of Sound
What has always bothered me right from the beginning of this whole thing is that at some point in the design process the one, two, three or synthetic AoA input question must have come up. And when it did, surely someone put their hand up and said “With only one AoA vane feeding the FCC, an early failure of the sensor will only come to light when either the AP is switched off and/or the flaps are retracted. This really is not the time/speed/altitude/phase of flight to have large amounts of AND.”
Given that it is unthinkable that all potential outcomes weren’t modelled, who on earth decided that this was an acceptable risk to take? ��
Because Boeing has become a fully financialized company, beholden to Wall Street, profit & greed above all. The lack of sensor testing ensured there was no additional simulator training requirement for crews. It is alleged there was a $1 million penalty for Boeing per airframe with one large customer if simulator training was required.
Minimizing changes
Throughout the MAX’s development, Boeing was intent on minimizing design changes that could require extra pilot training, said Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features but not the MCAS system. Extra training could have added costs for airlines introducing the MAX into service.
The company had promised Southwest Airlines Co. , the plane’s biggest customer, to keep pilot training to a minimum so the new jet could seamlessly slot into the carrier’s fleet of older 737s, according to regulators and industry officials.
Mr. Ludtke recalled midlevel managers telling subordinates that Boeing had committed to pay the airline $1 million per plane if its design ended up requiring pilots to spend additional simulator time. “We had never, ever seen commitments like that before,” he said.
WSJ
How Boeing’s 737 MAX Failed [article non-paywalled]
You are exactly right, internally there would have been good people advising their managers of possibility of accidents. The managers appear to have taken the chance that this would never surface. This is why, in my view, there was not a whisper of the MCAS in the pilot manuals. They wanted this thing hidden should an accident happen, and then attempt to blame the pilots as nobody had knowledge of this new system.
This is the most repugnant, cynical and craven aspect of the whole episode. Their strategy was "we will always blame the crew" should, what they convinced themselves was a remote possibility of an accident. I also believe that the outstanding & expert investigation by PPRuNe contributors was, and continues to be a thorn in their side for this strategy. In the future, they may reconsider how their skimp on the engineering based on the realisation there is a group of anonymous uncorruptables who don't like seeing their dead colleagues carrying the can of responsibility for the profit above all strategy engineering failure.