Re: Regulators joining forces (post #779 c.f.)
Back in the 1930s, when the FAA and the EASA's British and French precursors were in their formative stages, there were lots of airplane manufacturers. And lots of companies exploring ways of commercializing the new technology. There was so much anarchy for the *AAs to tame that they were able to use common sense, without any political interference to speak of, while they set up the rules. The rules were pretty good, and have left aviation with a first century to be proud of.
That's all gone now. The number of airplane manufacturers is not so much a handful as a fingerful. Just in the last year, national champions in Canada and Brazil (were) bowed out. You have your basic A and B, of course, but C (China) is just now taking off. Although J (Japan) is still at the gate, it would be premature to count them out now that Mitsubishi can build on Canadair's RJ program.
The FAA's decision-making is easy. It needs to re-establish its bona fides. Just enough resistance to show independence, I should think, then good-to-go. (God forbid that something really serious comes to light during testing.)
The EASA needs to show a little backbone, too. Not from A in this case, but from the FAA.
Even so, the EASA's decision will be a lot tougher than the FAA's. Long-term versus short-term interests are at stake. Like the FAA, the EASA knows that the ChineseAA's blessing of the MAX-fix is going to be a political decision taken as a minor part of the Xi-Trump tariff tiff. The most likely outcome is that the Max will not return to service in the Eastern hemisphere until a couple of months after it starts flying again in the USA and Europe. (Unless there's a big breakthrough on the tariff front.)
Longer term, say 20 or 30 years, A's primary competitor is going to be C, not B. Access to markets is going to be just as important as good design. (Ask any big tech company how things work in China.) I think the French political elite will guide the EASA through the thought process. Should the EASA/A simply maximize short-term profits from the FAA/B's stumble? Or should the EASA/A softly co-operate with the FAA/B now in order to establish a basis for long-term cooperation against C? Or should the EASA/A maximize medium-term gain by using the MCAS fiasco as a launch pad to force B to make the same transition from pilot-in-control to computer-in-control that A made 30 years ago?
It's inevitable. When each big country has just one airplane maker, the rules for making airplanes, and for using airplanes made by others, become matters of national interest. While the various *AAs may be able to remain independent in certain areas, like engineering analysis, their conclusions will increasingly flow through political channels. Regulation in aviation's second century might be quite different from its first.
It is going to be very interesting to watch how well the EASA co-operates with the FAA in getting the MAX airborne again. In practice, there is lots of room to maneuver while being "co-operative" and nobody knows this better than senior politicians.
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