prOOne
I think there are two different things here. First and foremost, if it is MoD policy to fund/support ATC gliding, then it must be done properly (see Engines' post) regardless of individual opinion on whether it is money well spent. That policy decision places a legal obligation on many MoD staff, and it has been serially ignored. Not only ignored, but conscious false declarations made that it has been met.
It is of relevance because the gliders share a Type Airworthiness Authority with, for example, Hawk. Not entirely tongue in cheek, I have suggested before that this thread be merged with the Cunningham one. Same people, same problems, same solution. Only real challenge is finding someone with practical experence of implementing the mandated regs that would have prevented both. Last time anyone was trained on this was around the time Engines was doing the Serco contract he mentioned. That's no coincidence. Today, I'd show the contractor DGDQA Standing Instruction 0136; they'd breathe a sigh of relief and get on with it. On this type of work there are 3 bibles; 0136, DefCon 112 (Repair) and Def Stan 05-125/2. Let me know if you find anyone in DE&S who can find a copy. Every project officer or manager involved in support should know them by heart.
I would just add one thing to the recent debate, which I've said before. One must look at root causes. (Those that, if removed, would have prevented the problem). At what level were they notified? Initially, direct to a 2 Star (ACAS) and 3 Star (RAF Chief Engineer) by the RAF Director of Flight Safety (a 1 Star).
When Mr Haddon-Cave reported, he simply repeated DFS' notifications; although omitted this gem and took the credit. Only four of his 90+ recommendations were rejected. Most of the rest were already mandated. That automatically places the problem at a very senior level.