I'd like to know how a fully automated system would have dealt with the
Cathay CX780 fuel contamination with one engine stuck at high thrust and the other at idle? How do you program that scenario? Ok, you don't, you have remote control. So it's not actually fully "automated", you have just moved the human decision maker to a different location. Still completely capable of making a Human Factor screw up. Humans have been covering for, and saving computers in aviation or a long time, the manufacturers may not even be aware of the extent and nature of this problem, see the Therac 25 report below and the operation of the fail safe mechanical interlock in opposition and protecting to the software command lethal dose. Two humans are the fail safe in aviation, we save a lot more than we kill.
The computer accidents history is replete with Human Factor screw-ups, they just occur in the coding cubicle, not the interface with the real world. A close read of the first documented computer accident, the
Therac 25 and some of Nancy Leveson's other work on comparing the introduction of
Software and the introduction of the High Pressure Steam powered era accidents and how to encourage public confidence should give anyone pause for thought about the future of aviation automation. Her contention is the software is the laggard and it's reliable operation is subject to enormous, drum roll please, Human Factors.
As Leveson sagely notes, the Steam business couldn't move forward until regulations had caught up with the boiler makers technological advancements and those regulations were driven by public outrage at the deaths and maiming caused by poor quality products.
Originally Posted by Nancy Leveson
A second reason for the number of accidents was that engineers had badly miscalculated the working environment of steam engines and the quality of the operators and maintainers. Most designs for engines and safety features were based on the assumption that owners and operators would behave rational, conscientiously and capably. But operators and maintainers were poorly trained, and economic incentives existed to override safety features in order to get more work done. Owners had little understanding of the workings of the engine and the limits of it's operation.
We have already had an inkling of the public's tolerance for accidents in this sphere with the 737MAX - two. Two accidents of a pilotless aircraft and the entire effort will be put in jeopardy. There are enormous risks by actually proceeding toward a commercial product