Originally Posted by
Fly Aiprt
And yet there is nothing fundamentally wrong with keeping T/O thrust when flying away from a low altitude stick shaker alarm, were it not for this MCAS event waiting to happen. Except when considering the chain of event with hindsight.
I'll agree that most pilots would be reluctant to reduce power close to the ground, but there has to be some point at which the flying pilot should have realized that the stick shaker event is erroneous and the aircraft is climbing and accelerating normally (and if there was any question as to whether the aircraft was stalling, there was no cause to retract the flaps). After that point, it
was fundamentally wrong to maintain takeoff thrust. The airspeed unreliable checklist is a memory item for a reason.
I'll confess that I'm a bit perplexed by the perspective that these accidents are a case of event A
or event B
or event C
or event D exclusive of the others. We pretty much know from previous history that aviation accidents are generally the result of multiple causes. Several things came together at the wrong time, and each should be addressed as appropriate. I frankly don't see why Ethiopian's training and operating standards should get a pass just because Boeing and the FAA dropped the ball.